Concorrência com escolas Charter, organização e desempenho acadêmico de escolas públicas tradicionais by Davis, Tomeka M.
 Journal website: http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/   Manuscript received: 6/18/2011 
Facebook: /EPAAA  Revisions received: 12/7/2012 





A peer-reviewed, independent,  







 Arizona State University 
 
Volume 21  Number 88  December 9th, 2013 ISSN 1068-2341 
 
 
Charter School Competition, Organization, and 
Achievement in Traditional Public Schools  
Tomeka M. Davis 
Georgia State University 
United States of America 
 
Citation: Davis, T. (2013). Charter School Competition, Organization, and Achievement in 
Traditional Public Schools. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 21(88) Retrieved [date], from 
http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/1279 
 
Abstract: Market models of education reform predict that the growth of charter schools 
will infuse competition into the public school sector, forcing traditional public schools to 
improve the practices they engage in to educate students. Some scholars have criticized 
these models, arguing that competition from charter schools is unlikely to produce 
significant change among public schools. Using data from the Early Childhood 
Longitudinal Study – Kindergarten Class, I attempt to identify potential mechanisms 
linking charter competition to achievement in traditional public schools. The results 
provide little support for the market model. Competition from charter schools is not 
associated with reading or math scores, and is only associated with three of ten 
organizational measures.  There is some support for an indirect relationship between math 
achievement and competition through reductions in teacher absenteeism, but these results 
fall short of meeting conventional thresholds for statistical significance. 
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Resumen: Los modelos de reforma de la educación basados en el mercado predicen que el 
crecimiento de las escuelas charter estimularía competencia con el sector de enseñanza 
pública, obligando a las escuelas públicas tradicionales a mejorar las practicas educativas 
con sus estudiantes. Algunos investigadores han criticado estos modelos, con el argumento 
de que la competencia de las escuelas charter es poco probable que produzca un cambio 
significativo en las escuelas públicas. Usando datos del Estudio Longitudinal de la Primera 
Infancia, intentamos identificar los mecanismos que unirían la competencia con escuelas 
charter a los logros en las escuelas públicas tradicionales (la organización escolar). Los 
resultados proporcionan poco sustento para el modelo de mercado. La competencia con 
las escuelas chárter no se asocia con mejoras en los logros en lectura o matemáticas, y se 
asocia únicamente con tres de cada diez medidas de organización. Los resultados indican 
una relación indirecta entre el rendimiento en matemáticas y la competencia a través de la 
reducción de ausentismo de los docentes, pero los resultados no cumplen con los mínimos  
convencionales de significación estadística. 
Palabras clave: escuelas chárter; competencia; organización escolar; rendimiento 
académico. 
 
Concorrência com escolas Charter, organização e desempenho acadêmico de escolas 
públicas tradicionais 
Resumo: Os modelos de reforma da educação baseados no mercado prevêem que o crescimento 
das escolas charter estimularia a concorrência com o setor de educação pública, obrigando as escolas 
públicas tradicionais a melhorar as práticas educativas com os alunos. Alguns pesquisadores têm 
criticado estes modelos, argumentando que a concorrência de escolas charter não é susceptível de 
produzir uma mudança significativa nas escolas públicas. Usando dados do Estudo Longitudinal da 
Primeira Infância, tente identificar os mecanismos que ligam a competição com escolas charter a 
melhoras pedagógicas nas escolas públicas tradicionais ( organização escolar ). Os resultados dão  
pouco apoio para o modelo de mercado. Competição com escolas charter não estão associadas com 
melhorias no desempenho em leitura ou matemática, e estão associada com apenas três de cada dez 
medidas de organização. Os resultados indicam uma relação indireta entre logros em matemática e 
competição associadas a redução do absenteísmo dos professores, mas os resultados não atendem o 
padrão mínimo de significância estatística. 
Palavras-chave: escolas charter; concorrência; organização escolar; rendimiento 
académico. 
Introduction 
Proponents of market models of education assert that providing families with the power to 
choose schools will significantly improve the American educational system (Chubb & Moe 1990; 
Finn et al., 2000; Friedman, 1962; Hess, 2004; Hoxby, 2002, 2003; Nathan, 1996). The market model 
of education is built on two primary premises: first, allowing families to choose schools rather than 
subjecting them to a strictly enforced school assignment plan will create a variety of schools that will 
better meet the needs and wants of families and second, choice will generate competition among 
schools that will maximize student achievement (Chubb & Moe, 1988, 1990; Finn et al., 2000; 
Friedman, 1962; Hess, 2004; Hoxby, 2003; Nathan, 1996). Neoclassical economic models contend 
that organizations engage in a variety of different behaviors to deal with competition, including 
increasing output, efficiency, innovation, etc. (Clark, 1961; Hirschman, 1970). Along these lines, a 
major assumption underlying current market reform in education is that competition will force poorly 
performing schools to better organize, or improve their academic practices and internal operations, 
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which will in turn lead to higher student achievement (Betts, 2009; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hoxby, 
2002, 2003; Nathan, 1996). However, sociologists, among others, have criticized these models, 
arguing that choice and market reform do little to enhance achievement or ameliorate educational 
inequality (Fuller, 2002; Lubienski, 2005; Mickelson, 2005; UCLA, 1998; Wells, 2002).  
Despite these critiques, reform in the shape of public school choice has gained significant 
favor in education policy initiatives across the country at various levels of governance (local, state, 
and federal) (Hess et al., 2001; Mickelson, 2005; Nathan, 1996; UCLA, 1998; Wells, 2002; Zimmer, 
et al., 2003). Charters schools are part of this reform. Charter schools represent a unique form of 
competition for traditional public schools, whose primary challenges until now have been choice in 
the form of residential mobility and private schooling. Charter schools are publicly funded schools 
that exist semi-independent from the control of local and state school authorities. Charter schools 
are public schools, and since they do not charge tuition like private schools, often compete with 
traditional public schools for a similar set of students. At least one argument cited by advocates of 
charter schools is that charter schools provide benefits to students who stay in traditional public 
schools because competition will compel traditional public schools to better meet the needs of 
students who remain in them. This is a common line of reasoning used by advocates of market 
reform, yet there have been few direct tests of this assertion (Teske et al., 2000; Zimmer & Buddin 
2007, 2009).  
Although several studies have examined whether competition from charter schools improves 
the achievement of traditional public school students, (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Booker et al., 2008; 
Hoxby, 2002, 2003; Sass, 2006), less research has focused on how schools respond to charter 
competition (Betts, 2009; Hess et al., 2001; Rofes, 1998; RPP International, 2001; Teske et al., 
2000). More specifically, these studies have not examined which specific practices within traditional 
public schools are related to competition. Moreover, the few studies that address this process fail to 
link these responses to achievement (Arsen & Ni, 2011; Cannata, 2011; Hess et al., 2001; Hoxby, 
2002; Rofes, 1998; RPP International, 2001; Teske et al., 2000). Studying this effect is akin to 
“unpacking the black box” of school choice and charter competition (Hess & Loveless, 2005; 
Zimmer & Buddin, 2007). 
This paper attempts to fill that gap. Here I examine whether charter competition is 
associated with the inner workings of traditional public schools and in turn, the achievement of 
students in those schools. I use a nationally representative sample of students to address three 
principal research questions: a) To what extent is competition from charter schools associated with 
student achievement in traditional public schools? b) To what extent is competition from charter 
schools associated with the organization of traditional public schools? c) Does school organization 
mediate the relationship between competition and achievement? That is, are the practices associated 
with charter competition also associated with achievement? I examine the effect of distance to the 
single nearest charter on reading and math achievement as well as ten teacher and administrator 
reported school organization variables. I find limited support for the notion that charter competition 
influences either school organization or student achievement in traditional public schools. 
The literature review is organized in the following manner. First, I present the theoretical 
argument and empirical predictions made by the market model of education reform to explain how 
competition from charter schools might compel changes among traditional public schools. Then I 
examine how the organization of charter schools is thought to differ from the organization of 
traditional public schools, and conversely, why charter competition may not lead to increased 
organization or achievement among traditional public schools. Finally, I review the findings of 
empirical studies testing the impact of charter competition on achievement and school organization. 
There is one important issue of note: the causal language used here to describe the market model 
reflects the predictions made by the theory and does not extend to my data or the inferences I draw. 
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Due to data limitations, I am unable to estimate any causal effects of charter competition. 
Consequently, this paper represents an exploratory examination of the relationship between charter 
school competition and the organization of traditional public schools and the performance of 
students in those schools. 
Competitive Pressures and Traditional Public School Reform: Theoretical Predictions 
Charter schools represent a unique form of competition for traditional public schools. 
Charter schools are one of the fastest growing segments of schooling in the U.S. Although they were 
non-existent prior to 1990, by 2009 charter schools were open in 40 states and the District of 
Columbia and enrolled approximately 2% of all public school students (Center for Education 
Reform 2009). Charters are still considered public schools since they are publicly financed, though 
charters do not typically receive the same per pupil expenditures as traditional public schools (Center 
for Education Reform, 2009; Cookson & Berger, 2002; Finn et al., 2005; UCLA, 1998). However, 
they are distinct in that they retain a level of autonomy and independent control not shared by 
traditional public schools. 
In addition to market orientations, the charter school movement originated from a number 
of different and sometimes disparate perspectives and themes, including the community schooling 
movement, school decentralization movement, the standards and accountability movement, and an 
interest among teachers and school administrators for more autonomy and innovation (Buckley & 
Schneider, 2007; Fuller, 2002; Wells, 2002). Despite the contrasting motives compelling their interest 
in charter schools, the various branches of the charter school movement share an underlying 
assumption of the market orientation: high performance among charter schools will stimulate 
widespread improvement among traditional public schools, forcing poorly performing ones to adjust 
to enhanced expectations (Buckley & Schneider, 2007; Cookson & Berger, 2002). A report from the 
Department of Education’s Office of Innovation and Improvement captures the idea that charter 
schools will encourage widespread improvement among all public schools: 
By allowing citizens to start new public schools with this kind of autonomy, making 
them available tuition-free to any student, and holding them accountable for results 
and family satisfaction, proponents hope that this new mix of choice and 
accountability will not only provide students stronger learning programs than local 
alternatives, but will also stimulate improvement of the existing public education 
system (2004, 1). 
In theory, the competitive pressure generated by charter schools is meaningful to traditional public 
school organization because a major motivation of the charter school movement focuses on 
improving upon and oftentimes deviating from the traditional practices and programs utilized by 
regular public schools to educate students. Since market logic presumes that charter schools are more 
effective than traditional public schools, market logic also predicts that regular public schools will 
step up their efforts and move towards engaging in similar practices as charter schools in an attempt 
to compete. Indeed, embedded in the market model of education is the assumption that competition 
leads to institutional isomorphism among service providers in the educational marketplace and 
would compel traditional public schools to mimic charters or similar models of education reform 
that are believed to be more effective. Institutional isomorphism is a common argument used to 
explain why the behavior of formal organizations tends to be similar across firms. 
The concept, taken from institutional theory in sociology, in part argues that firms copy the behavior 
of successful existing organizations for at least three reasons: a) as a response to competition b) as 
means of establishing legitimacy in a new field or c) as a response to uncertainty or coercive pressure 
from other organizations upon which they depend (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Lubienski, 2003). In this scenario, all three reasons suggest that traditional public schools 
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would mimic the behavior of charters. As competitors, charters schools threaten to take the clientele 
of traditional public schools, therefore traditional public schools might mimic them in order to 
compete. Moreover, in response to the coercive pressure created by the accountability mandates of 
NCLB, market theory would argue that traditional public schools may look to charters as a model, 
especially since one of the ideas compelling charters has been their increased accountability (Center 
for Education Reform, 2009; Nathan, 1996; Wells, 2002). 
School Organization as a Mediator 
While a large body of research has examined whether choice and/or competition increase 
achievement among traditional public schools (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Booker et al., 2008; Hoxby, 
2002, 2003; Sass, 2006), less inquiry has been devoted to understanding the specific mechanisms that 
are responsive to competition and responsible for promoting increased achievement. Some market 
proponents assert that increased competition will improve academic quality or school organization 
(Chubb & Moe, 1988; 1990; Hoxby, 2002). Within this context, school organization refers to the 
internal operations of schools or “the process through which schools produce desired outcomes” 
(Lee, Bryk, & Smith, 1993, 171).1 School organization as a concept can be situated within the 
framework of effective schools research, which attempts to identify and understand the 
characteristics of schools that produce high levels of academic achievement among students. This 
body of literature focuses on features like rigor of the academic program, opportunity to learn and 
time on task, staff and teacher relations, principal leadership, school-family connections, and so on, 
that facilitate favorable academic outcomes for students (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Lee, Bryk, & Smith, 
1993; Witte & Walsh, 1990). Though not all school practices necessarily result in improved 
achievement (for example, an emphasis on security and discipline), some, including increased 
opportunities for parental involvement, teacher quality, and time spent on instruction, enhance 
academic outcomes for students (Grubb & Allen, 2011). Thus, four core areas where the 
organization of charter schools, in theory, diverges from traditional public schools in ways that are 
predicted to increase achievement as a result of competition include: 
Expanded opportunity to learn and an increased focus on high standards. Two core 
approaches utilized by charters to maximize student achievement involves expanding opportunity to 
learn by allocating more time for instruction and increasing academic standards (Center for 
Education Reform, 2009; Finn et al., 2000; U.S. Charter Schools, 2010; U.S. Department of 
Education, 2004; Zimmer & Buddin, 2007; Zimmer et al., 2003). One way many charters provide 
students with increased opportunity to learn is by increasing the length of the school day and/or 
school week (Center for Education Reform, 2009; Zimmer & Buddin, 2007; Zimmer et al., 2003). 
This substantially increases the total amount of instructional time for students. In addition, the 
charter movement emphasizes the positive academic climate fostered by charters in which there is 
an increased expectation for high achievement and curricula designed to promote high standards 
(Center for Education Reform, 2009; Finn et al., 2000; U.S. Charter Schools, 2010; U.S. Department 
of Education, 2004). Consequently, market theory would predict that in an effort to compete, 
traditional public schools facing competition from charters may mimic charter schools by allocating 
more time for instruction or by setting high standards for students. 
Parental outreach and involvement. Charter school advocates also point out that charters 
                                                
1 Effective schools is another term associated with the process by which schools shape student achievement. 
Witte and Walsh (1990) define the phrase “effective schools” in the following manner: “In the most general 
sense the term connotes a belief and argument that school process, environment, and structure can make a 
difference in student achievement” (p. 188). 
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provide parents with significantly more opportunities for involvement and parent-teacher 
interaction, sometimes making it a requirement for enrolling their children in a charter (Becker et al, 
1997; Finn et al., 2000; Nathan, 1996). Indeed, many parents elect to send their children to charters 
because they want more voice in their children’s education (Stambach, 2001; Zernicke, 2002). 
Therefore, traditional public schools facing competition from charter schools might encourage more 
parental involvement to satiate parents and reduce the likelihood they will exit traditional public 
schools for a charter. 
Increased effort and commitment from teachers. Market advocates contend that 
competition from charter schools will change the characteristics of and demands on personnel in 
traditional public schools (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2003; Hoxby, 2002). Market logic predicts that 
competition from charter schools will result in additional pressure on teachers to demonstrate 
increased effort. Competition may compel school administrators “to be more aggressive in pushing 
teachers to perform better and dismissing teachers who do not perform well” (Hanushek & Rivkin, 
2003). 
Innovation. Innovation refers to engaging in methods not commonly practiced in regular 
public schools, including using different instructional and pedagogical techniques and designing 
unique curricula and programs. Lubienski (2003) notes that innovation is not only a widely cited 
policy goal in charter school legislation across states, but also that charter reformers assume, 
consistent with market philosophies, that freedom from traditional bureaucratic school governance 
will result in the implementation of different and innovative practices to educate students. 
Why Charter Competition May Not Lead to Improved Organization and Achievement 
Although market models predict that competition from charter schools will force traditional 
public schools to be more like charter schools in order to compete, there are at least two reasons to 
expect that competition from charter schools would not induce public schools to change their 
organizational practices. First, rather than compelling traditional public schools to compete and 
change, institutional theories suggest that charter school growth will not lead to changes in 
organization among public schools because of deeply entrenched cultural and institutional rules that 
press charter schools to mimic traditional public schools and not the reverse (Goldring & Cravens, 
2008; Lubeinski, 2003, 2005). Indeed, some research suggests that many charter schools’ 
instructional, classroom, and administrative practices are more similar to traditional public schools 
than they are different. Moreover, others note that there are no mechanisms in place for charter 
schools and regular public schools to learn from one another (Hess et al., 2001; UCLA, 1998). In 
addition, charters may not lead to increased organization among traditional public schools if charter 
school location is a function of school and neighborhood characteristics (Betts, 2009). For example, 
if charters locate in economically disadvantaged areas where schools lack the resources to serve 
students well, regardless of competition, then charter schools may not be inducing change in ways 
predicted by the market model. A large body of literature in education documents the lack of 
resources among schools in poor neighborhoods (Adamson & Darling Hammond, 2012; Darling 
Hammond, 2004; Kozol, 2005; Loeb, Darling-Hammond, & Luczak, 2005; U.S. Department of 
Education, 2011). These schools are likely to have less funding and the concomitant problems 
associated with it including lower teacher quality, problems with physical resources and facilities, etc. 
Similarly, while charter school operators may intentionally locate close to schools that are already 
performing poorly in the hopes of attracting families dissatisfied with it (Betts, 2009), many charters 
also directly aim to serve students in such neighborhoods, not because they think they can compete 
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better, but rather because they are committed to improving outcomes for students in need (Pattillo, 
2007).2 
Empirical Research on Charter Competition 
The empirical research on competition has generated mixed evidence regarding the effects of 
charter schools on traditional public school achievement (Bettinger, 2005; Booker et al., 2008; 
Hoxby, 2003; Sass, 2006; Zimmer & Buddin, 2009). Many of these studies combine measures of 
charter representation inside a district with geographical distance to traditional public schools. The 
rationale for this methodology is that regular public schools may feel more threatened and respond 
to a greater degree when charter schools are physically closer, since proximity potentially increases 
the likelihood that a charter might attract a school’s students. Some studies find that charter 
competition within a 10 mile radius is associated with increased reading and math scores, but only by 
a fraction of a point for every percent increase in charter school representation (Booker et al., 2008; 
Holmes, DeSimone, & Rupp, 2003; Sass, 2006). Other studies find that competition from charter 
schools either reduces or has no impact on traditional public school student test scores (Bettinger, 
2005; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Zimmer & Buddin, 2009). Moreover, different studies find conflicting 
results within a single state. For example, while Bettinger (2005) and Bifulco and Ladd (2006) find 
negative or negligible effects in Michigan and North Carolina, Hoxby (2003) and Holmes, 
DeSimone, and Rupp (2003) find positive effects in the same respective states. 
To date, the body of research investigating the effects of competition on the inner workings 
of public schools is small. Using data from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), a nationally 
representative data set on schools and teachers, Hoxby (2002) found more public school choice was 
associated with increased demand for teachers with degrees from selective colleges and teachers with 
advanced math and science skills, and was also associated with increased teacher effort and 
responsibility. However, although Hoxby found that competition was associated with increased 
selectivity and effort on the part of teachers, her study was limited to teacher attributes and did not 
examine the extent to which these attributes influenced achievement. Thus, we can only discern that 
competition was related to certain aspects of school organization, at least in terms of the selectivity 
and effort of teachers; we cannot ascertain whether those specific characteristics of teachers 
influenced student achievement. 
Other evidence suggests that competition from charter schools may not be transforming the 
organization of traditional public schools in ways intended to facilitate academic achievement. Rofes 
(1998) studied twenty five districts affected by charter schools and found that most schools and 
school districts had not responded to charter schools with “swift, dramatic improvements.” 
                                                
2 Another reason to expect that charter schools may not lead to meaningful changes in achievement in 
traditional public schools is because charter schools may act as “safety valves”, relieving traditional public 
schools of burdens like overcrowding and low achieving and/or disadvantaged students (Hassel, 1998; RPP 
International, 2001). The exit of struggling students out of traditional public schools in districts with more 
charter options may explain the effect of charter competition on achievement. Previous research indicates 
that minority students, especially Black students, are overrepresented in charter schools, either because they 
are attracted by the mission of charters or because charters specifically target these students (Booker, 
Zimmer, & Buddin, 2005; Buckley & Schneider, 2005; Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, & Wang, 2011; Lacireno-
Paquet et al., 2002; Finn et al., 2000; Miron & Nelson, 2002; RPP International, 2000; Zimmer et al., 2003). If 
charter schools siphon off minority students who typically have lower test scores (Jencks & Phillips, 1998), 
then scores in traditional public schools might increase. This safety valve effect is akin to selection bias –
minority students are more likely to attend charters, therefore test scores in traditional public school test 
closer to a charter might increase for this reason. 
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Lubienski (2005) and Rofes (1998) found that many public schools and districts respond to 
increased numbers of charter schools by creating aggressive marketing and advertising campaigns or 
began offering before or after school care in an effort to keep parents in traditional public schools. 
Teske et al. (2000) studied the effects of charter school competition in four medium-sized 
Northeastern cities and the District of Columbia and found that charter competition had not 
“induced large changes in district-wide operations, despite the fact that a significant number of 
students left the district schools for charter schools” (p. 1). Similarly, Cannata (2011) found that 
principals felt competition from charter schools had little effect on their financial resources or their 
recruitment of teachers and students, while Arsen and Ni (2011) found that regular public schools in 
districts with more competition from charter schools were not more likely to shift financial 
resources to achievement related activities. 
Methods 
Data 
I use data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study–Kindergarten Class (ECLS-K) and 
the Common Core of Data to assess the effects of charter school competition on school 
organization and student performance in regular public schools. ECLS-K is an up-to-date, nationally 
representative data set that includes comprehensive information on a large sample of primary school 
students and the schools they attend from kindergarten through 8th grade. A number of features of 
the ECLS-K make it well-suited for analyzing the relationship between competition, organization, 
and achievement. First, ECLS is advantageous because it contains a substantial set of measures 
assessing school organization. These organization measures are vital to understanding how schools 
respond to charter competition. In fact, this extensive focus on school practices makes ECLS-K an 
ideal data set to address the connection between school organization and school choice related 
issues (Berends & Tice, 2008). Second, ECLS-K allows me to tie school organization to student 
achievement, something that is scarce in the extant literature on public school choice and charter 
competition (Hoxby, 2002; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2003; RPP International, 2001). Third, previous 
studies have been limited to a single state or a restricted set of localities. Researchers have focused 
significant attention on states with strong charter laws and large numbers of charter schools, 
including Arizona, California, Texas, and Michigan (Bettinger, 2005; Booker et al., 2008; Hess et al., 
2001; Hoxby, 2003; Sass, 2006). The rationale underlying such concentrated scrutiny has been that 
the effects of competition are best understood under those circumstances where charter competition 
is widespread, thereby generating “a viable, competitive charter sector and thus a potential 
traditional public school response” (Booker et al. 2008, 125). However, this kind of one-size-fits-all 
analysis is problematic because results from a single state may have few implications for other 
contexts (Cookson & Berger, 2002; Zimmer et al., 2003). Although state-level variation in charter 
laws is an important consideration, this variation can be controlled statistically using a nationally 
representative sample of students. 
I use data from the third grade wave of data collection of ECLS, which assessed students 
and the schools they attended in the Spring of 2002. Although this time period captures charter 
schooling in its incipient stages, I limit my analysis to the third grave wave primarily because: a) the 
ECLS-K sample size is larger in the earlier waves; sample size decreases by about 20% in each 
successive wave due to student attrition b) more importantly, the third grade wave contained the 
most comprehensive set of school organization measures, in terms of focus and quantity. 
Specifically, the third grade wave of ECLS included more questions about general school and 
teacher practices whereas subsequent waves focused more on individual teacher methods and 
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teacher assessments of individual students and student outcomes. For example, in the later waves, 
the teacher surveys place a greater emphasis on asking teachers to evaluate student-specific 
behaviors, tendencies, and proficiencies (whether the surveyed child’s parents have attended a 
parent-teacher conference, time spent on specific math, reading, and science concepts, whether the 
surveyed student is a discipline problem, etc.) rather than on more general teacher and school 
practices (frequency of parent-teacher conferences, overall time spent on math and reading lessons).3  
While ECLS-K assesses students and their schools at fifth and eighth grades, almost all of the 
organization measures used here are assessed only at the third grade wave and are not assessed at the 
later time periods. 
The Common Core of Data (CCD) is an annual census of all public schools and public 
school districts in the nation compiled by the National Center of Education Statistics under the 
auspices of the U.S. Department of Education. I combined school and district-level data from the 
2000–2001 and 2001–2002 waves of CCD with student and school-level data from ECLS–K. 
Although there were a total of 15,305 students included in the third grade wave of ECLS, I 
eliminated 2,663 private school students and another 3,611 students who transferred schools 
between the first and third grade waves, the latter in an effort to limit the potential influence of 
student movement between schools (Betts, 2009; Ni, 2012). I was also forced to exclude the 
remaining students who lacked the proper sampling weights (primary sampling unit or strata 
weights, N=2,558 after the aforementioned ineligible students were dropped). While the use of 
survey weights resulted in a reduction in sample size, by design, the weights are adjusted for 
nonresponse. These adjustments ensure that the sample is still nationally representative even though 
some students are missing survey weights (NCES, 2003a). Thus, prior to the loss of missing data, 
only 6,727 of the 15,305 students in the third grade wave of ECLS were eligible for analysis. To 
account for missing data, I use multiple imputation for all ordinal and interval-ratio variables (M=5). 
After the exclusion of 812 cases with no distance measures (as a result of improper latitude and 
longitude information in CCD) and another 63 cases with missing data on some nominal variable, 
my final sample consisted of 5, 852 students in 836 traditional public schools (see Table A1). 
Dependent Variables 
School organization. I used two sets of measures taken from teacher and school 
administrator surveys of ECLS-K that, based on previous research on charter schools, capture the 
core organizational practices and schooling activities believed to differentiate charter schools from 
traditional public schools including opportunity to learn and a focus on high standards, parental 
outreach, teacher effort, and innovation (Center for Education Reform, 2009; Hoxby, 2002; 
Lubienski, 2003; Nathan, 1996; UCLA, 1998; Finn et al., 2000). Although ECLS gathers information 
on school characteristics and practices from both teachers and administrators, some of the measures 
are self-reported data gathered from a single school administrator. Because of potential bias inherent 
in self-report measures (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002), and in light of previous research, which 
suggests that principals may feel more pressure from charter competition (Teske et al., 2000), I used 
measures from both teachers and administrators wherever possible to gain a more reliable 
representation of school organization. The first set of measures came from teacher surveys assessing 
how much class time per day teachers spend on reading and math lessons or projects (opportunity 
                                                
3 In fact, both the 5th and 8th grade waves of the data fail to ask teachers or administrators about the general 
frequency of parent teacher conferences. Previous research (Finn et al., 2000; Zimmer et al., 2003) suggests 
that charter schools provide parents with significantly more opportunity to interact with teachers. 
Consequently, this is a very important topic area that these waves do not address. 
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to learn), whether teachers feel academic standards in the school are too low (focus on high 
standards), how many regularly scheduled parent conferences are offered by teachers during the year 
(parental outreach), and how many hours outside the workday teachers spend preparing for their 
classes (also teacher effort). The second set of organization measures consists of school 
administrator responses to five questions. The first of these questions asked administrators to rate 
the frequency of teacher-parent conferences (parental outreach). The second question asked 
administrators to rate the extent to which teacher absenteeism was a problem at their school (teacher 
effort). The remaining three measures asked principals to assess how much emphasis they place on 
the following goals and objectives: using curricula aligned and instructional strategies aligned with 
high standards (focus on high standards), and openness to new ideas and methods (innovation). 
Student achievement. I used third grade reading and math IRT scores as measures of 
achievement. 
Key Independent Variable 
Charter school competition. I used a proximity measure that calculated the distance 
between each traditional public school and the nearest elementary and middle grade charter schools 
in each state as my primary measure of competition. To generate this measure, I matched each 
traditional public school in ECLS (N=2,388) with each elementary/middle grade charter school in 
the nation (N=1,036) in 2000 through CCD; I retained only those matches that were located in the 
same state. Then, using longitude and latitude data available for all schools in the 2000–2001 wave of 
CCD (supplemented by latitude and longitude information obtained through geocoding when this 
information was unavailable in CCD), I used the SPHDIST command in STATA to measure the 
distance between each traditional public school and each of its elementary/middle grade charter 
matches.4 Since there is significant variation and overlap in grade level cutoffs for schools across 
schools and districts, especially charter schools, the distance measure used here includes elementary 
as well as middle school charters. For example, while traditional elementary schools in a respective 
locality may include kindergarten through fifth grade, a charter school in that locality serving 3rd 
grade students may house kindergarten through eighth grade. 
I utilized the distance between each school in the final ECLS sample and the single closest 
charter in the state as the nearest distance measure. Since a distance of zero miles means that there 
are no charters in a state, I created a series of dummy categories for distance to the nearest charter. 
These dummies include whether the nearest elementary or middle grade charter school is within 2.5 
miles or less, 2.51 to 5 miles, 5.1 miles to 10 miles, 10.1 miles to 25 miles, or more than 25 miles. 
The distance variable is lagged and measured in the 2000–2001 school year, the year prior to when 
organization and achievement are measured. 
State and District-Level Controls 
Restrictiveness of charter school laws. Given concerns about variation in charter school 
laws across states and the implications this has for the potential impact of competition, I include a 
measure intended to capture limitations placed on charter school growth across states. This measure 
ranks states in terms of the restrictiveness of their charter school legislation. This variable was taken 
from The Center for Education Reform’s 2000 report on Charter School Legislation and State 
Rankings. Each state was assigned a ranking based on ten criteria regarding the openness of their 
                                                
4 I used geographic information systems (GIS) software to generate latitude and longitude coordinates for 
school addresses when this information was missing from CCD. Despite these added efforts, many of the 
schools with missing latitude and longitude coordinates have post office boxes listed as their address, making 
efforts to generate coordinates for them futile, since they do not represent the physical location of the school. 
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charter school laws. 5 The original rankings ranged from 1 to 37, with lower scores indicating laws 
that contribute positively to the growth and development of charter schools. Since the scale is coded 
so that higher scores indicate less favorable charter laws, I add the score 38 to the scale to represent 
states with no charter laws and no charter schools. 6 
District enrollment, and per pupil expenditures. In addition, some research indicates 
that schools in districts with larger enrollments feel less threatened by the emergence of charter 
schools than smaller districts (Arsen & Ni, 2008; Hess et al., Rofes, 1998; RPP International, 2001). I 
include data on district enrollment from CCD to control for this possibility. In addition, I include a 
per pupil expenditure variable that accounts for financial resources spent per student within each 
district. Both variables were taken from the 2001 CCD District Finance file. 
School-Level Controls 
I include school SES and school racial composition to gauge the resources available to 
schools as well as the characteristics of the student body. I use the percentage of students eligible for 
free and reduced lunch as indicators of school SES and the percentage of White students in a school 
as a measure of school racial composition. Moreover, in light of research which suggests school size 
may be related to achievement as well as organization (Lee, Bryk, & Smith, 1993), I include student 
enrollment to account for this possibility. 7 
Student-Level Controls 
I include student prior achievement, race, SES, and gender as predictors of student-level 
achievement. I use student 1st grade reading and math IRT scores as measures of prior achievement. 
Race is a five category dummy-coded variable. Gender is a dichotomous variable with female coded 
as 1. ECLS uses a composite variable comprised of mother and father’s education and occupation 
and household income to measure SES. It reflects the family’s socioeconomic status at the time of 
data collection (Spring of 1st grade). It is a standardized scale with a mean of 0 and a standard 
                                                
5 These ten criteria include: a) restrictions on the number of charter schools open at one time, b) allowing 
entities other than the local school board to authorize charter schools, c) permitting a variety of 
persons/groups to start charter schools, d) permitting charter schools to open without evidence of local 
support, e) extending legal autonomy to charter schools, f) permitting charter schools to start from scratch 
rather than only allowing conversion charters (schools that were once traditional public schools), g) 
guaranteeing 100% of per-pupil funding, h) freeing charter schools from restrictions on local school district’s 
collective bargaining agreements, i) granting charter schools control over how funds are spent, and j) 
exempting charter schools from state education laws and regulations. 
6 I tested an alternative means of accounting for this unmeasured variation: a state-level fixed effects model 
using dummies for each state (where all states without charters were the single reference category). This 
method suffered from collinearity problems and many of the dummies were automatically omitted from the 
analysis. Consequently, I use the Center for Education Reform measure instead. 
7 While it is certainly plausible that school organizational characteristics affect student achievement, schools 
also “need a nucleus of motivated and academically able students to provide a stable institutional base” (Lee, 
Bryk, & Smith 1993). Average aggregate achievement at the school-level may affect which practices schools 
are able or see fit to implement (Barr & Dreeben 1983). For example, a school with high levels of 
achievement may be more (or less) innovative than a school with low levels of achievement where personnel 
may think a “basics” approach may benefit low achieving students most. In supplementary analyses not 
reported here, I accounted for this possibility by controlling for prior achievement at the school-level. I used 
1st grade math and reading IRT scores, aggregated at the school-level, to measure school-level prior 
achievement. I tested the impact of these measures only in the analyses assessing the relationship between 
competition and school organization. Their exclusion does not affect the general pattern of results. 
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deviation of 1. Scores below zero reflect a family SES less than the mean and scores above 1 reflect 
an SES above the mean (See Table A2). 
Analytic Strategy 
There are three considerations that compel the analytic strategy. Two considerations involve 
data design. First, the data is hierarchically structured: students are nested within schools, which are 
in turn nested within states. Since standard regression analyses ignore clustering and the problems 
associated with it (independence of observations, standard errors that are too small), it is important 
to use a modeling strategy, which takes the nested structure of the data into consideration. 
The second consideration involves sampling design and the survey weights generated to 
account for this. As a result, I use the set of SVY commands in STATA to analyze the data.8 These 
commands were designed to analyze data with complex sampling designs involving weighting, 
clustering, and stratification.9 
The third consideration driving the analytic strategy involves the hypotheses regarding 
organization as an intervening variable mediating the relationship between competition and 
achievement. This consideration dictates the sequence of the analyses. The analytic model is 
depicted in Figure 1. The most common method for establishing mediation in a model like that 
presented in Figure 1 involves testing four sequential regression equations. These equations are: 
  Y = i1 + cX + e1      (1) 
M = i2 + aX + e2      (2) 
Y = i3 + bM+ e3      (3) 
Y = i4 + c’X + b’M+ e4     (4) 
where Y refers to achievement, X refers to competition, and M refers to organization, c is the 
coefficient relating competition to achievement, a is the coefficient relating competition to 
organization, b is the coefficient relating organization to achievement, c’ is the coefficient relating 
competition to achievement adjusted for organization, b’ is the coefficient relating organization to 
achievement adjusted for the effect of competition, i1, i2, i3, and i4 are intercepts and e1, e2, e3, and 
e4 are residuals (Baron & Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon et al., 2007).10  While this method requires that 
researchers first establish a direct relationship between X and Y, for purposes of this analysis, this is 
a substantively meaningless step, since I (nor the market model I am testing) make specific 
arguments about the effect of competition existing independent of organization. In other words, my 
goal is to ultimately test the indirect effect of competition on achievement through organization, and 
the method I use requires that I establish a significant direct path between competition and 
achievement first. 
                                                
8 Krull and Mackinnon (1999) find that OLS estimators of multilevel mediation models are less efficient at 
estimating mediated effects than multilevel estimators because they lead to downwardly biased standard 
errors. Although I do not use multilevel estimators specifically, the SVY commands in STATA are commonly 
used to account for clustering issues that lead to downwardly biased standard errors. 
9 I use the variable C5CPTPSU for the PSU weight, the variable C5CPTSTR as the strata weight, and C5CW0 
as the student-level weight. For more information about these weights, see the ECLS-K Third Grade User’s 
Manual (NCES, 2003). 
10 Recent research has been critical of the Baron and Kenny (1986) method for establishing mediation 
(Gelfand, Mensinger, & Tenhave, 2009; Kraemer, Kiernan, Essex, & Kupfer 2008; Mackinnon et al., 2007). 
Kraemer et al. (2008) and Mackinnon et al. (2007) argue that in order to establish mediation, researchers must 
also demonstrate that X and M interact. While I considered this analytic strategy, none of the sources 
promoting this method provide details on a subsequent test for partial mediation (e.g. something comparable 
to a Sobel test). Therefore, I proceeded with Baron and Kenny’s approach. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model Depicting Predicted Relationship between State Charter Competition, 
School Organization, and Achievement in Traditional Public Schools 
 
However, there are two problems with this approach to establishing mediation. First, this 
method does not provide a statistical test of the indirect effect of the independent variable (charter 
competition) on the dependent variable (achievement) through the mediator (organization). Second, 
the requirement that there must be a direct effect of X on Y to establish complete mediation may 
lead to an increased probability of Type II errors, as one may still be able to establish partial 
mediation by examining the indirect effect of X on Y (MacKinnon et al. 2002). An alternative 
method requires testing the significance of the indirect effect using a Sobel (1982) test. The formula 
for the Sobel test is: 
z= !∗!!!!!!!!!!!!        (5) 
where the terms for a and b in equations 2 and 3 are multiplied, then divided by the square root of 
the sum of the squared a and b terms multiplied by the other term’s squared standard error. The 
resulting term is then compared to a standard normal distribution to test for significance. I use the 
Sobel test in combination with the step method to assess relationship between charter competition, 
school organization, and achievement. Due to space limitations, I present the coefficients for the key 
independent variables only. 11 
One limitation of the ECLS data stems primarily from omitted variable bias regarding why 
charters school locate where they do as well as the lack of consistency of measures across the 
various waves of data collection. In charter school research, scholars are concerned with 
endogeneity regarding where charter schools locate and in turn who they serve or self-selection bias 
that influences who attends charters versus traditional public schools. Charter schools may not 
randomly locate and there are plausible reasons to believe that charter schools might be in greater 
demand near schools and districts that are dysfunctional. This is problematic because non-random 
effects potentially mask any positive influence charter school competition might have on school 
organization. Some research suggests that charters are more likely to locate in minority 
                                                
11 Full tables are available upon request. 
Traditional Public School 
Organization 
Traditional Public School 
Student Achievement c 
State Charter 
Competition 
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neighborhoods, though these neighborhoods tend to be middle-class rather than poor (Henig & 
McDonald, 2002). 
Researchers typically use fixed effects models or instrumental variable approaches (Bifulco 
& Ladd, 2006; Hoxby, 2002; Sass, 2006) to eliminate bias stemming from unobserved characteristics 
dictating the non-random location of charter schools that could affect the relationship between the 
charter competition and achievement. By eliminating this bias, these techniques strengthen the case 
for causal inference. However, both methods were problematic here. School fixed effects models 
were problematic because they are only appropriate to use with panel or longitudinal data where 
each variable is measured at more than one time point. Although ECLS is longitudinal, many of the 
teachers reported measures of school organization I utilize are only collected at the 3rd grade wave 
of data collection. Consequently, since many key variables have no temporally prior or later match, I 
was forced to find another way to account for the potential nonrandom location of charters. 
Similarly, although the data structure was amenable to an instrumental variable approach, 
instrumental variables are not always an ideal solution to resolving problems associated with omitted 
variable bias since faulty instruments can yield extremely biased estimates, ironically despite the 
method’s primary aim to produce unbiased ones. I tested five instruments — charter school law 
openness, district size, percent of Black and Hispanic residents in each traditional public school’s 
census tract, and percent of people below the poverty line in each traditional public school’s census 
tract. All proved to be inadequate as they yielded improbable coefficients. 
Results 
Descriptive results 
Table 1 displays weighted means for the key variables, first for all students, then separately 
for students in schools with charter competition and students without. Seventy-seven percent of the 
students in the final sample are enrolled in schools in states with charters (roughly 4500 of the 5800 
students). Since charter schools only enroll approximately 2-3% of students nationwide, this 
measure of competition is therefore quite broad. On average, the nearest charter school is located 
about 30 miles away from each student’s traditional public school. Thus, although the majority of 
students in the sample attend traditional public schools in states with charters, the nearest charters 
are still, on average, over 25 miles away. Table 2 clarifies this result. About one-quarter of the 
traditional public schools students in the sample are in schools located 2.5 miles or less from a 
charter, while another quarter of the students are enrolled in schools more than 25 miles from a 
charter. The remaining students are distributed among the other distances. The smallest percentage 
of students (6%) are enrolled in schools in the 2.51 to 5 mile range. With regard to the achievement 
and organization measures, Table 1 shows that at first glance, there do not appear to be strong 
differences between traditional public schools facing competition from charters versus those not 
facing charter competition. Thus, although the market model assumes that organizational changes 
will occur as a response to competition, these descriptive statistics suggest there is little variation in 
the organizational characteristics between schools facing competition and those lacking competition 
from charters. 
To better understand the magnitude of these differences, I calculated the difference between 
the mean for traditional public schools facing competition from charters and traditional public 
schools with no competition as a percentage.12 The largest difference between the two groups is for 
                                                
12 I used the following formula to calculate these differences: (  *100. 
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academic standards being too low and teacher absenteeism. Teachers and administrators in schools 
facing competition are 5.78% less likely to report that standards are too low and 5.58% less likely to 
report that teacher absenteeism is a problem compared to schools not facing competition. Among 
the remaining variables, the differences between the groups range from 0.06% and 2.12%. 
Moreover, five of these differences are not in the direction predicted by the market model.  
The market model suggests that schools facing charter competition should have superior 
organizational characteristics compared to charter schools, yet, the findings here indicate that 
teachers in schools facing competition from charters spend less time on reading and less unpaid time 
preparing lessons, while administrators are less likely to report having curricula aligned with high 
standards and being open to new ideas and methods, and report having fewer parent-teacher 
conferences (though these differences are small). 
Is charter competition associated with traditional public school student achievement? 
I begin the multivariate analyses by estimating the direct effect of charter school competition 
on reading and math achievement. This is represented by Path c in Figure 1; these results are 
presented in Table 3. Market models predict that students in areas with more competition from 
charter schools will have significantly higher test scores than students in districts with less 
competition from charter schools. Contrary to these predictions, the findings indicate that distance 
to a charter school has no association with either reading or math achievement. Still, despite the 
insignificance of this direct path from competition to achievement, competition may still impact 
achievement through organization, which the proceeding analyses aim to test. 
Is charter competition associated with traditional public school organization? 
In this set of analyses, I test the relationship between charter competition and the various 
aspects of traditional public school organization, which I define as the practices and methods 
associated with learning that are carried out in schools. This analysis is represented by Path a in 
Figure 1; the results are presented in Table 4. Each column in the table represents a different 
measure of school organization. Table 4 shows that distance to the nearest charter school is 
associated with one teacher reported organization variable — whether teachers feel that academic 
standards are too low. The coefficient is significant and negative for all the distance categories 
except the 2.5 mile or less category. This question is worded so that a high score indicates that 
teachers agree with the statement “the academic standards at this school are too low”, thus lower 
scores mean that teachers disagree with the statement. Substantively, this finding indicates that 
compared to traditional public schools that have no charters in their state, teachers in traditional 
public schools facing competition from charters feel that standards are not too low. The coefficients 
are largest for the 2.51–5 and 5.1–10 mile categories. Thus, teachers believe standards are high 
(enough) at these distances. However, the coefficients are smaller for the higher distance categories. 
This means that even when traditional public schools are more than 10 and 25 miles away from 
charters, teachers still believe that academic standards are high compared to teachers in states with 
no charter schools, but not as much as teachers in schools closer to charters. Nevertheless, the fact 
that teacher reports for this measure in schools closest to charters (the 2.5 mile or less category) are 
statistically no different than teachers in schools facing no charter competition may reflect some bias 
associated with where charter schools locate. For instance, if charters are located in areas where 
traditional public schools are underresourced or contain a large body of students who struggle  
 
  


















Competition Measure      
Distance to Nearest Charter School 
(Statewide) 
- - - 30.066 Distance to the nearest elementary or middle grade charter school in the state (Min=0, 
Max=231.754) 
Teacher Reported Measures      
Time Spent on Reading Lessons and 
Projects 
3.203 .024 3.217 3.199 How much time do children in your class work on lessons or projects in the following 
general topic area, whether as a whole class, in small groups, or in individualized 
arrangements?  Reading/language arts (1=1-30 minutes to 4=more than 90 minutes) 
Time Spent on Math Lessons and 
Projects  
2.403 .019 2.364 2.414 How much time do children in your class work on lessons or projects in the following 
general topic area, whether as a whole class, in small groups, or in individualized 
arrangements? Mathematics (1=1-30 minutes to 4=more than 90 minutes) 
Academic Standards too Low 1.817 .023 1.902 1.792 Indicate the extent to which you agree with the statement “academic standards at this 
school are too low” (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) 
Number of Regularly Scheduled 
Teacher-Parent Conferences 
2.933 .032 2.923 2.936 How many regularly scheduled conferences do you offer or schedule with a parent or 
guardian of each child in your class during the school year? (1=no conferences to 4=3 
or more conferences) 
Unpaid Time Spent Preparing 
Lessons 
3.455 .031 3.457 3.455 Other than time spent during the work day, on average how many hours per week do 
you spend preparing for the class you teach (1=2 hours or less per week to 5=15 or 
more hours per week) 
Administrator Reported Measures      
Using Curricula Aligned with High 
Standards 
2.914 .010 2.917 2.913 How much emphasis do you place on the following goals and objectives for your 
teachers?  Using curricula aligned with high standards. (1=no emphasis to 3=major 
emphasis)  
Using Instructional Strategies Aligned 
with  High Standards 
2.873 .013 2.847 2.881 How much emphasis do you place on the following goals and objectives for your 
teachers?  Using instructional strategies aligned with high standards. (1=no emphasis to 
3=major emphasis) 
Openness to New Ideas and Methods 2.813 .013 2.835 2.806 How much emphasis do you place on the following goals and objectives for your 
teachers?  Openness to new ideas and methods. (1=no emphasis to 3=major emphasis) 
Frequency of Teacher-Parent 
Conferences 
3.058 .029 3.095 3.047 Please indicate how often the following activities are provided by your school:  
Teacher- parent conferences. (1=never to 5=7 or more times a year) 
Teacher Absenteeism a Problem 1.882 .031 1.971 1.861 Indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement:  Teacher 
absenteeism is a problem at this school.  (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) 
Student-Level Achievement Measures      
   3rd Grade Reading IRT Score 107.879 .676 108.788 107.613 Min=42.42, Max=148.950 
   3rd Grade Math IRT Score 85.259 .645 85.571 85. 155 Min=30.310, Max=120.420 
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Table 2. 
Share of Students in Each Charter School Distance Category 
Percent of Students in Schools Not Facing Charter Competition 22.932% (N=1,342) 
Percent of Students in Schools Located 2.5 Miles or Less from a Charter 25.393% (N=1,486) 
Percent of Students in Schools Located 2.51 to 5  Miles from a Charter 6.374% (N=373) 
Percent of Students in Schools Located 5.1 to 10 Miles from a Charter 10.407% (N=609) 
Percent of Students in Schools Located 10.1 to 25 Miles from a Charter 10.116% (N=592) 
Percent of Students in Schools Located 25 Miles or More from a Charter 24.778% (N=1,450) 
Total 100% (N=5,852) 
 
Table 3. 
Weighted OLS Regression Estimates (Unstandardized) of Charter School Distance on Traditional Public School 
Reading and Math Achievement  
 Reading Math 
























Constant  64.665 45.577 
F statistic    301.31  422.88 
N        5,852   5,852 
Note:  All models control for student-level 1st grade achievement, SES, gender, race (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, 
Other), school-level % free and reduced lunch, % White, school size, urban vs. suburban/rural,  region (northeast, vs. 
west/south/Midwest), and district-level per pupil expenditures and enrollment. All models also include a control for 
charter limitations across states). 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001.  
 
academically, school personnel may adjust their standards in light of this reality. Indeed, all the 
teacher and principal organization measures in the 2.5 mile or less category do not differ statistically 
from those of teachers and principals in traditional public schools facing no competition. 
Table 4 also shows that distance from a charter school is associated with two administrator 
reported organization variables – emphasizing instructional strategies aligned with high standards 
and teacher absenteeism. Proximity to a charter appears to matter only for schools in the middle 
ranges of distance, not at the extremes, even the closest distances. Compared to traditional public 
schools without charters in their state, principals in traditional public schools located between 2.5 
and 10 miles away from charters report lower levels of teacher absenteeism. Similarly, principals of 
traditional public schools located between 5.1 and 10 miles away from charter schools are more 
likely to report that instructional strategies at their school are aligned with high standards. As with 
academic standards, traditional public schools in the 2.5 mile or less range appear statistically no 
different than traditional public schools in states without charters with regard to instructional 
strategies and teacher absenteeism. 
Taken together, these results provide limited support for the market model. The next set of 
analyses address whether organization mediates the relationship between competition and 
achievement. 
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Does organization mediate the charter competition effect on achievement? 
The results from the two previous analyses offer evidence that is only minimally consistent 
with the market model of competition. Reading and math achievement were not associated with 
distance to the single nearest charter, though three of the organization variables – academic 
standards being too low, aligning instruction with high standards, and principal reports of teacher 
absenteeism – were related to distance. Thus, even though charter competition had no direct effect 
on achievement, if the organization variables that were influenced by competition also influence 
achievement, then it is possible to make the case that charter competition may indirectly affect 
achievement. This indirect relationship is consistent with criticisms of the step method for 
establishing mediation, specifically that a failure to establish a significant direct path between the 
independent and dependent variable leads to Type II errors because there may be a significant 
indirect pathway through the mediator (MacKinnon et al. 2002). 
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of analyses where I assess the impact of the ten 
organization variables on reading and math achievement (path b of Figure1). Only one of the 
organization variables is associated with reading achievement in the expected direction (principal 
reported frequency of parent-teacher conferences), while three are associated with math 
achievement (time spent on math, principal reported frequency of parent-teacher conferences, and 
teacher absenteeism). While it is disappointing to consider that even these characteristics of schools 
appear to have little impact on achievement (Grubb & Allen, 2011; Hanushek, 2003), there may be 
some reason to expect that student background characteristics have a greater impact on reading 
achievement than school factors (Coleman, 1966; Entwisle & Alexander, 1994). Still, the school 
organizational characteristics that were affected by competition did not affect achievement, at least 
reading achievement. Consequently the only organization variable that has potential for partially 
mediating the relationship between organization and achievement is teacher absenteeism for the 2.51 
to 5 mile category and the 5.1 to10 mile category for math achievement. Teacher absenteeism is 
associated with competition and math achievement; consequently, it meets the criteria for partial 
mediation. 
To explore this possibility, I use the Sobel (1982) method of testing the significance of the 
indirect effect. Two of these indirect effects reach marginal statistical significance. The resulting z 
statistic for teacher absenteeism for traditional public schools located 2.51 to 5 miles away from 
charters is 1.844 and the corresponding p-value is .065. The resulting z statistic for teacher 
absenteeism for traditional public schools located 5 to 10 miles away from charters is 1.709 and the 
corresponding p-value is .105. Both just miss the conventional criterion for statistical significance (p 
≤ .05), though they both fall within the range of marginal significance (p ≤ .10).13  
Discussion 
This study used a nationally representative data set to examine the relationship between 
charter school competition, school practices, and achievement in traditional public schools. 
Advocates for market reform argue that charter schools benefit students in traditional public schools 
because the threat of losing students to charters will force traditional public schools to better serve 
                                                
13 I use Kristopher J. Preacher’s interactive calculator for the Sobel test available at 
http://quantpsy.org/sobel/sobel.htm 
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Table 4. 
Weighted OLS Regression Estimates (Unstandardized) of Teacher and Administrator Reported School Organization on Charter School Distance 
 Teacher Reported Measures Administrator Reported Measures 
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3.019 2.339 2.270 3.039 3.379 2.890 2.908 2.916 3.457 1.241 
F statistic  
 
2.91*** 3.34*** 6.76*** 5.16*** 4.17*** 1.17 1.20 3.21*** 6.53*** 8.26*** 
N 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 
Note: All models control for % free and reduced lunch, % White, school size, urban vs. suburban/rural,  region (northeast, vs. west/south/Midwest), and district-level 
per pupil expenditures and enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses. * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤. 01, *** p ≤ .001.  
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Table 5. 
Weighted OLS Regression Estimates (Unstandardized) of Teacher and Administrator Reported School Organization on Traditional Public School Reading 
Achievement  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Organization          
Time Spent on Reading .087 
(.259) 
        
Academic Standards too Low  .114 
(.288) 
       
# of Regularly Scheduled Parent Conferences 
(Teacher) 
 
  .182 
(.406) 
      
Unpaid Preparation Time      -.045 
(.207) 
     
Curricula Aligned with High Standards 
 
    .309 
(.723) 
    
Instructional Strategies Aligned with High 
Standards 
 
     -.350 
(.610) 
   
Openness to New Ideas and Methods       -1.234* 
(.553) 
  
Frequency of Parent-Teacher Conferences 
(Principal) 
 
       .610* 
(.313) 
 
Teacher Absenteeism         -.717 
(.421) 
          
Constant 64.215 64.227 63.918 64.649 63.591 65.518 68.092 62.437 65.487 
          
F statistic 231.48*** 231.87*** 243.87*** 231.51*** 235.91*** 242.93*** 238.53*** 235.79*** 240.94*** 
N 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 
Note:  All models control for student-level 1st grade achievement, SES, gender, race (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Other), school-level % free and reduced lunch, % 
White, school size, urban vs. suburban/rural,  region (northeast, vs. west/south/Midwest), and district-level per pupil expenditures and enrollment. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001. 
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Table 6. 
Weighted OLS Regression Estimates (Unstandardized) of Teacher and Administrator Reported School Organization on Traditional Public School Math 
Achievement  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Organization          
Time Spent on Math 1.171*** 
(.324) 
        
Academic Standards too Low  .583* 
(.257) 
       
# of Regularly Scheduled Parent Conferences 
(Teacher) 
 
  .030 
(.298) 
      
Unpaid Time Spent Planning Lessons     .112 
(.159) 
     
Curricula Aligned with High Standards 
 
    .795 
(.841) 
    
Instructional Strategies Aligned with High 
Standards 
 
     -.148 
(.659) 
   
Openness to New Ideas and Methods       -1.229* 
(.592) 
  
Frequency of Parent-Teacher Conferences 
(Principal) 
 
       .620** 
(.252) 
 
Teacher Absenteeism         -.769** 
(.254) 
          
Constant 42.844 44.211 45.385 45.091 43.180 45.910 49.065 43.342 46.394 
          
F statistic  464.33*** 474.43*** 462.04*** 454.61*** 465.04*** 486.31*** 461.87*** 455.54*** 462.67*** 
N 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 5,852 
Note:  All models control for student-level 1st grade achievement, SES, gender, race (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Other), school-level % free and reduced lunch, % 
White, school size, urban vs. suburban/rural,  region (northeast, vs. west/south/Midwest), and district-level per pupil expenditures and enrollment. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001. 
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the students who remain in them, though the evidence investigating this claim has been mixed. This 
study’s main contribution centers on pinpointing a mechanism that is related to both charter 
competition and achievement in traditional public schools. 
The evidence presented here provides little support for the market model. The first set of 
findings suggests that proximity to a charter school has no impact on either reading or math 
achievement. However, three of the ten organization variables examined were associated with 
distance to a charter, but not for traditional public schools closest to charters. Instead, charter 
proximity only seemed to matter for schools between 5 and 10 miles from charters, not the closest 
category used here, which was 2.5 miles or less. Teachers were more likely to report that academic 
standards were higher in all the distance categories other than the 2.5 mile category, while principals 
were more likely to report increased frequency of parent-teacher conferences and lower levels of 
teacher absenteeism at the middle ranges of distance from a charter. Finally, though teacher 
absenteeism was the only organization variable associated with both organization and achievement, 
leaving some possibility for establishing an indirect relationship between charter competition and 
achievement, the results of analyses testing the significance of the indirect effect of distance to the 
nearest charter on math and reading achievement through teacher absenteeism fell slightly short of 
conventional statistical significance. 
What explains the limited evidence for the market model? A simple explanation is that 
competition from charter schools may not be associated with significant improvements in 
organization or achievement. On the other hand, these findings may highlight problematic 
assumptions about competition and the capacity of traditional schools to respond to it. Traditional 
public schools may be limited in their ability to respond to competition because they may lack the 
finances or power to implement change (Betts, 2009; Rofes, 1998; Teske et al., 2001). This 
possibility seems to be illustrated in the lack of findings for traditional public schools closest to 
charters (located within 2.5 miles of the nearest charter). These schools may not have the resources, 
human or fiscal, to respond to competition, particularly if charters intentionally locate in 
neighborhoods with high concentrations of poor and minority students. Thus, the lack of findings 
for close proximity to a charter may reflect bias from unmeasured variables, since I was unable to 
control for decisions influencing where charters locate. Charters may intentionally locate close to 
underperforming schools, making it appear that close proximity to a charter would have no effect on 
achievement or organization. This is, admittedly, a limitation of this research and future research 
should consider establishing a more direct causal link by using methods to control for omitted 
variable bias. In spite of this minor shortcoming, ECLS is one of the only existing nationally 
representative data sets that allow researchers to link student achievement to school organization, 
and in combination with CCD, allow me to tie charter competition to these processes. 
Consequently, this analysis represents a compelling step toward understanding the mechanisms 
linking market reform to educational outcomes. 
In addition, although charter competition was associated with improved aspects of 
organization, these changes appear to have been too modest to yield any meaningful improvements 
in achievement. However, some research suggests that charter competition may affect the scores of 
minority students far more than White students (Booker et al., 2008). Since I do not separate 
traditional public school students into subgroups, it is possible that competition and its concomitant 
association with organization may be more beneficial to disadvantaged students. 
While the lack of evidence supporting the notion that charters increase achievement 
reinforces some existing research (Bettinger, 2005; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Zimmer & Buddin, 2009), 
the findings of this study contribute to the literature on competition in education in two important 
ways. First, it adds to the even smaller body of literature assessing the impact of charter competition 
on school organization (Arsen & Ni, 2011; Cannata, 2011; Lubeinski, 2005; Rofes, 1998). More 
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importantly, the present research makes the case that the connections between 
competition/organization and organization/achievement should be analyzed in tandem, since the 
organizational factors influenced by competition did not necessarily influence achievement, 
particularly reading achievement. This connection between organization and achievement is 
important, since policy efforts devoted to using charter competition to improve practices that have 
no impact on achievement would potentially waste valuable resources (Grubb & Allen, 2011; 
Hanushek, 2003). 
While competition from charter schools does not seem to improve student achievement in 
traditional public schools, charter schools still provide a meaningful alternative for many parents and 
students in search of schooling options (Coons & Sugarman, 1978). Thus, this study does not seek 
to malign charter schools. Rather, these findings draw attention to some of the limits and 
possibilities of market ideology as a solution to the problems plaguing American education. 
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Table A1. 
Missing Data for Key Variables 
 Percent of Imputed  Cases 
(out of 5,852 cases) 
Teacher Reported Organization Measures  
Time Spent on Reading Lessons and Projects 5.297% 
Time Spent on Math Lessons and Projects  5.007% 
Academic Standards too Low .547% 
Number of Regularly Scheduled Teacher-Parent Conferences 1.675% 
Unpaid Time Spent Preparing Lessons 1.333% 
Administrator Reported Organization Measures  
Using Curricula Aligned with High Standards 11.637% 
Using Instructional Strategies Aligned with High Standards 11.654% 
Openness to New Ideas and Methods 11.842% 
Frequency of Teacher-Parent Conferences 11.586% 
Teacher Absenteeism a Problem 11.774% 
Student-Level Achievement Measures  
3rd Grade Reading IRT Score 1.128% 
3rd Grade Math IRT Score .684% 
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Table A2. 
Weighted Means for Student, School, and District-Level Control Variables 
 










Student Controls    
   1st Grade Reading Score 67.725 68.025 67.636 
   1st Grade Math Score 54.996 55.290 54.910 
   White .622 .721 .593 
   Black .134 .103 .142 
   Latino .183 .125 .200 
   Asian .033 .020 .037 
   Other .028 .032 .027 
   SES -.078 -.078 -.078 
   Gender .495 .496 .495 
School Controls     
  %  Students on Free Lunch & Reduced Lunch 42.479 40.221 43.142 
   % White 62.045 72.160 59.075 
   School Size 528.671 466.475 546.932 
   Northeast .202 .200 .200 
   Midwest .267 .333 .248 
   West .222 .083 .263 
   South .309 .3384 .286 
   Urban .300 .290 .303 
   Suburban .414 .340 .435 
   Town/Rural .286 .370 .262 
District Controls    
District Enrollment 47322.690 24961.780 53888.040 
Per Pupil Expenditures 9246.377 9109.614 9286.532 
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